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ABSTRACT
In today's real estate market, characterized by
overbuilding and capital shortages, real estate owners must
identify new sources of capital to finance their projects. This
paper suggests that Japanese investors are well positioned to
take advantage of the current illiquidity in the U.S. real
estate market. Historically, Japanese investors have invested
primarily in "trophy" office buildings and resort hotels. This
paper suggests that Japanese investors have much to gain by
considering retail investments, particularly large, high-
quality regional shopping centers. It further indicates that
there are many advantages for these investors to purchase
regional shopping centers using real estate securities.
The empirical portion of the study investigates which real
estate security structure may be best suited for Japanese
investors. The performances of two publicly traded regional
shopping center securities -- EQK Green Acres M.L.P., a single-
asset regional center security, and First Union Real Estate
Investment Trust, a pooled-asset regional center security --
were analyzed. Additionally, a computer model was used to
simulate the performance of four different security structures:
participating debt, convertible debt, leveraged equity, and
unleveraged equity. It was assumed that these structures were
privately placed and backed by regional shopping centers. The
model's results indicated that convertible mortgage securities
performed the best while leveraged equity investments performed
the worst. These results were tested using a sensitivity
analysis and it was determined that, with some qualifications,
the hybrid debt structures -- participating and convertible
-- provided investors with the highest returns and the least
volatility.
Thesis Supervisor: Lynne B. Sagalyn
Title: Associate Professor, Department of Urban Studies and
Planning
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CHAPTER 1
CRISIS AND OPPORTUNITY
Introduction
In the early 1980s, real estate securities were heralded by
industry professionals as a new and innovative way to finance
commercial real estate. Encouraged by the success of the
residential mortgage-backed securities market, the opportunity
to securitize the $800 billion commercial mortgage market
generated much interest, particularly on behalf of Wall Street.
Once securitized, commercial mortgages, in theory, would become
liquid and tradeable like residential mortgage-backed
securities. Today, however, only 5% (approximately $40 billion)
of the commercial mortgage market has been securitized.
Despite this slow beginning, it is likely that commercial
mortgage-backed securities will play a significant role in
financing commercial real estate during the 1990s due to the
current paralysis of real estate capital markets. Today, even
owners with high-quality projects and strong operating histories
are struggling to secure financing. Clearly owners need to
identify new sources of capital to finance their projects;
securitization may be a viable option. In order for
securitization to be a viable financing alternative for owners,
however, commercial mortgage-backed securities must be an
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attractive investment option for investors.
This paper suggests that Japanese investors have much to
gain by considering real estate security investments and that
U.S. real estate owners would benefit from the increase in
available capital a successful securities market would bring.
Despite the overbuilding in most metropolitan markets, Japanese
investors continue to see advantages in investing for the long
term in U.S. real estate relative to other investment
alternatives. Traditionally, these investors have purchased or
financed high-profile or "trophy" office buildings and resort
hotels. One of the objectives of this paper is to investigate
the advantages to Japanese investors of buying securities backed
by other high-quality asset classes, particularly regional
shopping centers. The second objective is to explore how these
securities can be structured for Japanese investors.
Liquidity Crisis
According to Anthony Downs, Senior Fellow at the Brookings
Institution, the current lack of liquidity in the real estate
market represents a fundamental shift from a 1980s' economy with
significant capital surpluses available for real estate
investment to a 1990s' economy with very little capital being
invested in real estate. During the 1980s there were several
factors that contributed to the capital surpluses of the decade:
the deregulation of the U.S. savings and loan industry, the rise
of tax-shelter-driven syndications, the increase in domestic
pension fund assets, intensified competition among commercial
banks, and the escalation of foreign investment.
Today, however, most things have changed. The savings and
loan industry has collapsed, the tax laws have been changed,
pension funds have slowed their real estate investment activity,
and commercial banks have become much more regulated. In
addition to these factors, the overbuilding in most major
metropolitan areas and a drop in the demand for real estate as
a result of a nationwide recession with its concomitant job loss
have created a severe liquidity shortage. [5] The only factor
that has not changed for the worse has been the level of foreign
investment in the U.S., particularly on behalf of the Japanese.
Factors Causing the Capital Surplus and Shortage
From 1980 to 1989, commercial mortgages held by all thrifts
rose from $61.6 billion to $136.3 billion. While such mortgages
comprised only 10.2% of thrifts' entire mortgage portfolio in
1980, that proportion had risen to 17.5% by 1987. [5] In
addition, thrifts invested billions of dollars in joint ventures
with real estate developers during this period. In 1988 the
thrift industry collapsed because of bad real estate loans,
fraud, and mismanagement, among other things. Some of the
results of the collapse were the disappearance of half of all
thrift institutions that existed at the start of the 1980s and
the withdrawal of almost all surviving thrifts from investing
equity or loan funds in commercial real estate. Today, the
thrifts that survived have stopped making commercial loans and
have focused their attention primarily on originating single-
family mortgages. [5]
A second factor causing the current liquidity crunch is the
demise of tax-shelter-driven syndications. During the 1980s,
the Tax Act of 1981 permitted the offset of ordinary income
against depreciation and other passive losses, the benefits of
which provided ready capital for the real estate industry in
large amounts. Between 1980 and 1986, $33 billion in public
Real Estate Limited Partnerships (RELPs), were invested in real
estate through such syndications. [40] In 1986 syndications
were dealt a near fatal blow by the Tax Reform Act of 1986
(TRA). The TRA basically ceased to allow the deductibility of
passive losses against ordinary income and required taxpayers to
lengthen depreciation schedules. According to Downs, "Most of
the major syndication firms active during the 1980s either went
bankrupt, ceased to exist, consolidated or converted themselves
into consulting or asset management firms. As a result, unless
Congress reinstates some of the tax benefits that allowed this
industry to flourish, it is very unlikely small, retail
investors will provide funds the way they did in the 1980s to
the real estate industry." [5]
A third factor responsible for the decrease in capital
availability is the slowing of pension fund investment into real
estate. During the 1980s pension funds invested $100 billion in
real estate equity and increased their total allocation of funds
invested in real estate from nearly nothing to 3.5%. Today, with
the total return on pension fund real estate investments barely
beating yields on 90-day Treasury Bills (6.50%) [29], it is
unlikely that pension funds will allocate additional funds to
an investment with significantly greater risk.
The final factor that has decreased the availability of
capital in the 1990s, is the regulatory crack down on commercial
banks. In February of 1990 the Comptroller of the Currency
issued stringent orders to examine all banks and compel them to
tighten their underwriting standards. This policy was intended
to keep banks from making bad loans but instead it has pressed
banks to demand more equity contributions from existing
borrowers and to foreclose on loans if these contributions are
not forthcoming. Needless to say, these new regulations will
discourage banks from originating new loans for commercial real
estate projects. According to Downs, "This situation has
contributed mightily to the reduction of capital available for
financing real estate transactions, especially in 1990, and is
likely to last ... well into 1991." [5]
The results of these events have clearly created a capital
shortage. This liquidity crisis is particularly severe for
owners of large real estate assets, specifically owners of
regional shopping centers, because the amount of money necessary
to refinance such an asset can easily exceed $50 million per
transaction. In the U.S. alone, there are 682 regional shopping
centers of more than 800,000 square feet and another 1,148
between 400-800,000 square feet. The bulk of these centers were
put in place in the 1970s and 1980s. [22] Assuming that each
center requires refinancing every seven years, on average, and
conservatively assuming only 50 centers are refinanced each
year (4% of the total), if the average transaction size is $50
million, then the U.S. demand for capital to service these
transactions will be at least $2.5 billion per year.
With little or no capital currently being provided by
thrifts, small, retail investors, commercial banks, or pension
funds, it appears that the only significant source of capital
remaining for large real estate investments in the near future
are foreign sources. Such a situation creates an opportunity
for those foreign investors, such as the Japanese, who are
interested in investing in income producing property.
An Opportunity for Japanese Investors
Since 1985, the Japanese have invested more than $66.5
billion in U.S. real estate, with the bulk of their investments
concentrated in major metropolitan centers. Close to 56.7% of
Japanese total investment through 1990 was divided among
Honolulu, Los Angeles, and New York City, primarily in highly
visible or trophy office buildings and hotels. In addition, they
are continuing to invest in U.S. real estate despite a doubling
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of Japanese interest rates, a 40% decline in the Tokyo stock
market, and a weakening of the Japanese Yen. As shown on
Exhibit 1.1, Japanese investors increased their investment in
U.S. real estate from $1.86 billion in 1985 to a high of $16.54
billion in 1988, with the fastest growing segment of this market
being individual investors and investment companies who
accounted for just 9% of the total in 1985 but 20% in 1989.
According to Kenneth Leventhal and Company's prediction, this
segment of the Japanese investor market is likely to invest over
$2 billion in U.S. real estate in 1991 alone. [28,46] While not
enormous, when compared to the lack of funds provided by U.S.
institutions, this amount is significant. This growth in
Japanese investment, according to David Shulman and Susan Jordan
of Salomon Brothers Inc., is largely due to the historically
low dollar/yen exchange rate (which makes U.S. property seem
extraordinarily cheap to Japanese investors), the ongoing
Japanese current account surplus (which contributes to keeping
real interest rates in the U.S. high), Tokyo's exceptionally
high real estate prices, and the extremely low current yields
offered by commercial property in Tokyo and Europe (as low as
1%-2%) . [44]
Although the bulk of Japanese investment in U.S. real estate
has been in direct holdings [27], they have, since 1986, been
active in the real estate securities market. Since that
1 Kenneth Leventhal and Company predicts the total Japanese
investment could be as much as $10.0 billion in 1991.
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Exhibit 1.1
JAPANESE INVESTMENT IN U.S. REAL ESTATE
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Source: Kenneth Leventhal & Company
1985
time, Japanese investors have bought various real estate backed
securities such as the Chicago Mercantile Exhcange, Chicago, IL,
the JC Penney Building New York City, NY, and 55 Water Street,
New York City, NY, to mention a few. [38,41]
Real estate securitization is a method of financing real
estate through the use of stocks and bonds which are backed by
mortgages on real property. They are known as mortgage-backed
securities (MBS) and can be either publicly or privately issued.
Before securitizing commercial real estate, underwriters
must determine the credit support or credit rating necessary to
make the security saleable. Typically, credit ratings are
established through nationally recognized rating agencies such
as Standard and Poor's, Moody's Investors Service, and Duff and
Phelps. The goal of the rating agency, which serves as an
independent third party, is to rate the creditworthiness of
the issuer and the likelihood of his repaying the debt, in such
a way that potential investors can compare these securities
directly with the ratings of corporate securities. (Thus, AA-
rated mortgage-backed securities equal AA-rated corporate
bonds.) The rating agency focuses on cash flow reliability and
the quality of any credit supports such as corporate guarantees,
letters of credit, or additional collateral. [41]
Obtaining a credit rating can be costly and require
substantial disclosure on an annual basis on behalf of the
issuer. For this reason, some issuers issue securities without
a rating. For example, Japanese investors recently purchased
approximately $300 million in bonds for the Marriott Hotel at
Moscone Center in San Francisco, in a transaction which used a
Marriott corporate guarantee, in lieu of an investment grade
rating to secure a portion of the debt. This type of structure
may be acceptable to investors willing to evaluate the
collateral without the aid of a rating agency. [41]
MBS obligations can be offered and sold as domestic private
placements, as domestic public offerings, or as public offerings
in the Euromarkets. Where and how a security is sold impacts
the level of disclosure required of the issuer. Several
financings have been privately placed to groups of large
institutional investors who rely on the security's credit rating
rather than on their own in-depth due diligence. Such private
placements are exempt from registration under Section 4(2) of
the Securities Act of 1933 (the "Act") and are not, therefore,
subject to the Act's substantial disclosure and reporting
requirements. In a domestic public offering, however, the
entity issuing the bond would be highly regulated under the Act
and required to submit annual 1OKs. Reluctance to comply with
the detailed and time-consuming disclosure requirements of the
Act is one reason many offerings of MBS are structured either as
private placements or as domestically unregistered public
offerings in the Eurobond market. [41]
The marketability and eventual liquidity of a security will
be affected greatly by the type of offering the issuer pursues.
For investors willing to rely on their own due diligence,
issuers can often raise the financing they require through a
private placement without the level of full disclosure required
under the Securities Act. In the past, many of the securities
offered to Japanese investors have been private placements.2
To properly price a MBS, the issuer must consider the cost
of transaction fees as well as the cost of annual expenses. For
example, expenses such as legal fees, underwriting fees, rating
agency fees, printing costs, and the like, which are specific
to a securitized transaction, often average 100 to 200 basis
points of the face amount of the MBS. Most of these private
placements have been bought by a few, large institutional
investors. Although this cost, along with annual expenses such
as credit enhancement fees, rating agency fees, and trustee
fees, can raise the pricing, if structured properly, the issuer
could still save at least 50 basis points per annum, over
conventional debt, even after factoring in these other expenses.
[26,29,45] The challenge for underwriters is to structure a
security that offers attractive yields to investors without
pricing the security so that it is uncompetitive with
conventional mortgage debt financing.
For investors, the purchase of securities has several
advantages over direct real estate investment. First, MBS are
easier to evaluate in terms of risk because, typically, the
agency that rates the securities and the underwriter that issues
2 Most of these private placements have been bought by a few,
large institutional investors.
them perform all of the due diligence on the underlying real
estate asset. Second, MBS are, in theory,3 more liquid than
direct real estate investments because they are generally public
securities, trading in the secondary market in the same way
stocks and bonds trade. [41] Third, MBS make it possible to
carve a large real estate investment into small pieces to give
small to medium size companies and individual investors access
to real estate investments that, if purchased directly, would be
out of reach. [40] This is a particularly important point
considering that the fastest growing segment of the Japanese
investor market is individual investors and investment
companies. Fourth, making the investment more desirable than
direct investment for multiple investors permits issuers to
reach a broad range of investors with different risk profiles.
For example, Goldman Sach's financing in 1990 of the $500
million Saks Fifth Avenue acquisition by Investco, a Baharain
investment group, was structured using a two-tier debt
(senior/subordinated) structure to attract multiple investors
with different yield orientations. [21] Finally, while MBS do
not guarantee investors returns that are higher than direct real
estate investments, they do offer investors returns that are
consistently higher than similarly rated high grade corporate
securities. For example, according to Giliberto, AAA MBS today
3 It is interesting to note, however, that according to
Michael Giliberto, most of the Japanese investors who have
purchased MBS to date have not sold their positions. This suggests
that liquidity may not, in practice, be an important objective of
Japanese investors in real estate.
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trade at 100 to 125 basis points above high-grade corporate
bonds and 200 basis points above comparable Treasuries.
For all of these reasons the real estate securities market
has, in the past decade, emerged as an important financing
vehicle for all segments of the real estate industry. Today,
$800 billion worth of real estate securities, representing all
classes of real estate assets, have been issued and sold to
investors in both the private and public markets.
Approximately, $113 billion (or 15% of the total) represents
commercial mortgage-backed securities, public Real Estate
Investment Trusts (REITs), and Public Real Estate Limited
Partnerships (RELPs) while $675 billion (or 85% of the total)
represents residential mortgage-backed securities (See Exhibit
1.2). [16,39,44]
Despite these rather compelling reasons to favor real estate
securitization over direct investment, the MBS market has not
grown at the rate it was predicted to grow, nor has it dominated
the way in which commercial real estate is financed in the same
manner that it dominates the financing of single-family real
estate.
There are several reasons for this. One of the main reasons
is because other sources of low-cost conventional financing were
abundant during the 1980s when MBS were initially introduced.
Compared to the complexity, cost, and disclosure requirements of
issuing real estate securities, owners during this period chose
to finance projects directly through thrifts, commercial banks,
Exhibit 1.2
U.S REAL ESTATE SECURITIES OUTSTANDING
RELATIVE TO U.S. CORPORATE DEBT
900
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
Public RELPs Resid. Mortg.-Back
As of 1990
Source: Salomon Brothers and NAREIT
life insurance companies, pension funds, and foreign investors.
[16]
A second reason why the commercial real estate security
market has not expanded to the same degree as the single-family
secondary market is because most single-family residential
mortgage-backed securities4 are guaranteed by the Federal
government which makes them even more secure than either MBS or
high-grade corporate bonds. [41]
A third reason is that home mortgages are relatively
homogenous so that mortgage underwriting and documentation can
be standardized. In contrast, no two commercial mortgages are
alike; they obtain their respective values from various factors
such as markets, leases, location, owners, and management.
Therefore, these mortgages are more heterogenous and harder to
pool. In addition, commercial MBS typically secure nonrecourse
obligations of the borrower as opposed to single-family home
mortgages which are always recourse. [41]
A fourth reason is that, in the past, pension funds have not
purchased these securities to the same degree they have other
corporate securities or single-family residential MBS. A fifth
reason why the commercial real estate security market has not
expanded to the same degree as the single-family security market
is that life insurance companies and commercial banks have not
purchased real estate securities, primarily because they prefer
to do their own investing and underwriting and to be more
4 Only GNMA securities are backed by the Federal government.
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actively involved in asset management issues. [16]
A final reason is that during most of the 1980s, the bulk of
the CMBS securities were purchased by the savings and loan
industry. Fueled by a net increase of $60 billion of new
deposits from 1980 to 1987, the thrifts were the primary buyers
of junk bonds and commercial mortgage-backed securities. [5]
For all the reasons discussed earlier, the thrifts are not
buying these securities today.
Conclusion
Arguably, although these reasons help to explain why the MBS
market did not take off during the 1980s they do little to
predict the future of the MBS market in the 1990s. This is true
because as this chapter has illustrated, the 1990s will be
fundamentally different than the 1980s particularly in terms of
sources and availability of capital. With no other sources to
turn to, real estate owners will have to consider using the MBS
securities market to finance their projects. The Japanese, as
one of the few players left with any capital, have a unique
opportunity. The question then becomes, given the number of
commercial properties available for securitization, which
properties offer the Japanese the best investment opportunity.
This question is the subject of Chapter 2.
After determining, in Chapter 2, that regional shopping
center securities offer an attractive investment opportunity for
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the Japanese, Chapter 3 evaluates two existing shopping center
securities in an effort to determine whether a single-asset
shopping center security or a pooled-asset security offers the
best return. The results do not permit comparisons to be drawn
in a way that can be generalized to all single-asset or pooled-
asset securities, but they do reveal that of the two securities,
the single-asset security performed better.
Using a computer model, Chapter 4 compares four alternative
security structures -- participating debt, convertible debt,
leveraged equity, and unleveraged equity -- in an effort to
determine whether one structure is preferable to the others in
terms of the security's return, volatility, and sensitivity to
different interest rate and equity participation structures.
The results suggest that, with respect to these criteria,
convertible debt performs the best.
Chapter 5 summarizes the results of this study and offers
suggestions, based on these results, for how underwriters might
approach designing a regional shopping center security for
Japanese investors.
CHAPTER 2
THE CASE FOR SECURITIZING REGIONAL SHOPPING CENTERS
As Chapter 1 has shown, there exists a special opportunity
for the Japanese to invest in U.S. commercial real estate by
investing in commercial mortgage-backed securities. The focus
of this chapter will be to compare various classes of commercial
real estate assets in an effort to determine whether any
particular class of commercial assets -- office, retail, R&D or
industrial -- will offer the Japanese a better return and
whether any particular asset class is more suitable for
securitization.
Retail Assets versus Other Commercial Assets
To compare the historical returns of these four asset
classes, the mean return for each class was calculated for 1978
to 1990 using quarterly return data provided by the Russell-
NACREIF index (RN). This index, an industry benchmark, includes
return data -- broken down into income and capital components -
- on 1,506 unleveraged institutional-grade properties
representing as of 1990 $22.18 billion in assets. Next, as
presented in Exhibit 2.1, the standard deviation and coefficient
of variations for each class were calculated.
The standard deviation represents how volatile the quarterly
returns were over the investment period. The coefficient of
variation, calculated by dividing the standard deviation by
the mean quarterly return, permits the classes of assets to be
compared to one another in terms of return and volatility.
EXHIBIT 2.1
Quarterly Returns for Real Estate Assets
Russell-NACREIF Index
(1978:4-1990:4)
Mean % STD % CV.
Office 2.51 2.61 1.04
Retail 2.72 1.12 0.41
R&D 2.53 1.73 1.28
Indust. 2.77 1.28 0.46
S&P 500 3.85 8.10 2.10
Source: Frank Russell Company
Exhibit 2.1 indicates that while the mean returns of the four
asset classes are very similar, the volatility of the retail
investments (per unit of return), as measured by the coefficient
of variation, are the lowest. This result suggests that over
a 12-year holding period, retail assets produce the most stable
returns. To the extent that the mean returns among assets
classes are similar, the lower volatility of retail could be a
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reason for investors to prefer retail to other asset classes.
However, several qualifications regarding this method of
valuation must be mentioned. First, as noted earlier, the RN
only includes data for 1990 on 1,506 unleveraged properties
representing $22.18 billion in assets. This index is not a
perfect representation of the industry because it follows only
investment grade real estate. Even more important for this
study, however, is the fact that the index does not include many
trophy real estate assets such as (super regional centers) which
limits the value of comparisons. Second, the return data
combines both the current return with estimates of capital
returns which are based on current market appraisals. Often
these appraisals lag actual market value by several months and
can be subject to appraisal bias and smoothing effects [49], all
of which could cause the volatility of the returns to be
understated. Finally, the RN data for retail properties does
not disaggregate returns for super regional malls, regional
malls, neighborhood, or community centers. This lack of
disaggregation coupled with the fact that there are very few
regional or super regional malls in the index's sample, limit
the usefulness of this index for this study; to the extent that
regional malls outperform or under perform the other categories
of retail assets, the true measure of their return is masked.
Because of these limitations, a second method of comparing
retail to other asset classes was used to confirm the results.
Using data supplied by Cameron Blake's 1988 study of REITs, [3]
retail REITs were evaluated with respect to a consolidated group
of 22 mixed-asset REITs.
EXHIBIT 2.2
Quartrely Return Measures of Three Retail REITs
Compared to a Consolidated
Group of 22 REITs
(1973:2-1988:1)
Mean % STD% CV.
Federal Realty 5.69 10.89 1.91
New Plan Realty 6.69 12.23 1.83
Pennsylvania REIT 5.88 12.56 2.14
Consolidated Sample 4.35 11.53 2.65
Source: Blake, Cameron, "The Real Estate Investment Trust:
Performance over the Business Cycle", MIT Thesis, 1988.
As Exhibit 2.2 indicates, the coefficient of variations were
slightly lower in all of the retail REITs than was the
coefficient of variation for the consolidated group. Although
the performance measures in this analysis are influenced to a
large degree by the value the stock market places on the REIT
security, as well as by other macroeconomic factors, [33,34] it
is useful in a general way to support the notion that, over the
long-term, retail returns may outperform other commercial
assets. Again, to the extent that the mean returns of retail
assets are similar to those of other classes, their lower
volatility makes them a better investment.
In addition to somewhat stronger performance, the nature of
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retail operations arguably make it preferable as a security
investment from the investor's perspective. This is because
retail assets are typically structured with percentage rent
clauses which permit owners (and investors) to share in a
potentially larger upside than standard escalating leases. While
most commercial assets such as offices and industrial buildings
have fixed lease structures that adjust periodically with
inflation, retail leases typically have percentage rent features
that kick in when a preset level of sales is reached by the
tenant. [4,26] For example, in the Rockefeller Center Complex
in New York City, the majority of the leases are office leases
with average terms of 10 years. In 1997, NBC, which occupies
19.5% of the space in Rockefeller Center, will renew its
existing lease for 20 years at a fixed net rental rate of $26.85
per square foot, compared to current market rents of $40-50 per
square foot. Although the owners gain security knowing that NBC
will remain in the complex after 1997, the upside potential of
the complex is somewhat limited since several anchor tenants,
in addition to NBC, have negotiated long-term below-current-
market leases. [45]
In contrast, the Green Acres Mall in Long Island, a 1.4
million-square-foot super regional mall, has leases from both
its non-anchor and anchor tenants that have percentage rent
clauses. Since 1986, tenant sales have increased at a
compounded annual rate of 6.5% and percentage rent has averaged
21% of the total rental income. Furthermore, JC Penney, Sears,
Gimbels, and Sterns (anchor tenants) have leases that average 25
years while non-anchor tenants have leases that range from 5 to
7 years. [10] Unlike Rockefeller Center, the owners of Green
Acres will have an opportunity to adjust rents upward for non-
anchor tenants at renewal. Aside from adjusting with inflation,
these rent "step ups" combined with percentage rent can create
greater upside for a regional mall such as Green Acres as
compared to an office complex such as Rockefeller Center.
This retail lease structure creates two tiers of returns with
different levels of risk to the owner. First, the base rent
return is more secure than the percentage rent and reflects the
credit quality of the tenant. Second, the percentage rent is
less secure because it is contingent upon the tenant's ability
to generate sales.
Because cash flow from the base rent is more secure than the
percentage rent, this cash flow could be said to share the
characteristics of a bond. Similar to a long-term high-grade
corporate bond, base rents of anchor tenants often reflect long
maturities (10-30 years), have fixed rates, and take into
account the credit quality of the tenant. This is so because
anchor tenants have historically had enormous leverage over
shopping center owners.5  Percentage rent resembles equity in
that the return reflects the operating volatility of the tenant.
Office and industrial properties most often do not have
5 See David Shulman, "Retail- The Next Office Market," Salomon
Brothers Inc, 1990, which suggests this balance of power is
shifting.
percentage rents, and thus do not have these two-tiered cash
flow streams. This difference in the lease structure of the
assets is what creates an opportunity for retail property
securitization.
Although a debt security has not yet been created to take
advantage of this existing two-tier lease structure, some
interesting structures would be possible. For example, a
vehicle could be created that offered senior notes and
subordinated notes with correspondingly different yields. The
senior class, representing the base rents, would have first
claim on the real estate (similar to that of a first mortgagee)
in the event of foreclosure and would, on that basis, carry a
rating of AA or better. The subordinated class, representing the
percentage rents, would be much less secure against a default
or delinquency (similar to a second mortgagee) and would,
therefore, offer higher yields. These notes would be unrated or
carry a below-investment-grade rating, and would appeal to
yield-driven investors with high-risk profiles.
To date, most retail developers such as DeBartolo Capital
Corp., Ernest Hahn Co. and Melvin Simon and Associates, have
successfully securitized regional centers using only single-
tranche debt securities. In the cases of DeBartolo's $120-
million Eurobond offering in July 1986 (secured by a pool of
shopping centers) and Hahn's $40-million fixed-rate offering in
the same year (secured by the Corte Madera shopping center in
Marin County), both were structured as senior-class debt and
underwritten on the basis of the strength of the minimum base
rent cash flows. [19] According to Goldman Sachs, the
underwriter, both transactions were rated AAA by S&P largely
because the base rents reflected the credit quality of the major
department stores which anchored the centers.
Regional Shopping Centers Versus Other Retail Assets
Given that retail assets, in general, appear to outperform
other classes of commercial assets, and lend themselves to
securitization, is there any particular category of retail asset
that recommends itself for purchase as a security by Japanese
investors? This thesis argues that, as compared to other
commercial assets and, in many cases, to neighborhood and
community shopping centers, regional shopping centers have
several characteristics that make the case for securitizing them
compelling: (1) the potential for large, single transactions;
(2) the existence of many strong mall managers/owners; and (3)
the ease of marketing highly visible or trophy properties, as
compared to less unique properties, to the Japanese.
Before discussing each of these characteristics, however, the
composition of the retail industry will be examined briefly.
Composition of Retail Industry
According to the Urban Land Institute in 1990, retail
shopping centers are characterized as follows [47]:
(1) Super Regional Center - The principal tenants in a super
regional center include at least three full-line department
stores of generally not less than 100,000 square feet each. The
median gross leasable area (GLA) is about 985,000 square feet
and the median sales per square foot is $210.67.
(2) Regional Center - The principal tenants in a regional
center include one or two full-line department stores of
generally not less than 100,000 square feet each. The median
GLA is about 470,000 square feet and the median sales per square
foot is $168.41.
(3) Community Center - The principal tenants in a regional
center often include a junior department store, variety store,
or discount store. The median GLA is about 161,000 square feet
and the median sales per square foot is $162.43.
(4) Neighborhood Center - A supermarket or superstore is the
principal tenant in this type of center. The median GLA is
about 68,000 square feet and the median sales per square foot is
$181.07.
For purposes of this study, this paper groups regional and
super regional shopping centers into one category refering to
them as regional shopping centers. In Exhibit 2.3, the
composition of the shopping center industry is broken down by
total GLA, number of centers, and the sales per square foot for
each center category. As shown, the majority of the centers in
the U.S. are neighborhood and community centers. While there
Exhibit 2.3
U.S SHOPPING CENTER INDUSTRY - 1990
TOTAL NUMBER OF CENTERS BY TYPE
Neigh. Center Com. Center Reg. Center Super Reg.
U.S. SHOPPING CENTER INDUSTRY - 1990
TOTAL CLA IN SQUARE FEET BY CENTER TYPE
1.371
Neigh. Center Com. Center Reg. Center Super Reg.
U.S. SHOPPING CENTER INDUSTRY - 1990
SALES DOLLARS PER SF BY CENTER TYPE
Neigh. Center Corn. Center Reg. Center Super Reg.
Source: Urban Land Institute, Dollars and Cents, 1990
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are far more of these centers than regional and super
regionalcenters, super regional malls and regional malls have
a weighted average sales per square foot of $182 as compared to
$172 for community and neighborhood centers. As shown in Exhibit
2.4, super regional and regional centers generate the most Net
Operating Income (NOI) per square foot, which is likely due to
the fact that they generally locate in areas where median
household incomes are high (greater than $35,000). These
figures suggest that regional and super regional shopping, as
compared to other centers, may have the best profit potential.
[26,47]
If regional centers are larger, have better quality tenant
profiles, and generate more NOI per square foot than other
retail products, then this segment of the retail market appears
to have many of the attributes that are prerequisites for
successful securitization, all of which will be discussed in
more detail in the following section.
Factors Favoring Securitization of Regional Shopping Centers
As noted earlier, one of the factors favoring the
securitization of regional shopping centers to that of other
retail assets, is the potential for large, single transactions.
In general, a securitized transaction must have a minimum
transaction value of $50 million to be feasible. [19,28,41]
While there have been security offerings of less than
Exhibit 2.4
U.S SHOPPING CENTER INDUSTRY - 1990
NOI PER SQUARE FOOT OF GLA
Neigh. Center Com. Center Reg. Center Super Reg.
Source: Urban Land Institute, Dollars and Cents, 1990
this amount, typically most issuers avoid offerings for amounts
less than $50 million because many of the costs in a securitized
transaction are fixed regardless of its size. Because
neighborhood shopping centers are much smaller than regional
malls, many more assets must be pooled to reach an economic
transaction size. This, in turn, requires much more due
diligence on the part of the underwriter.
Another important factor is the existence of many strong
regional shopping center owners/managers. One of the most
important considerations for any investor purchasing a real
estate security is the quality and experience of the underlying
asset's management. Unlike a corporate security, real estate
securities are evaluated by investors on the manager's ability
to lease, operate, renovate, and generally create and increase
value for the asset. When securities are offered either
publicly or privately, one indication of how investors assess
the strength of management is determined by how easily the
issue sells. As compared to the other categories of retail
assets, the regional shopping center segment of the industry has
many more experienced and recognized managers/owners, (Edward
DeBartolo, Melvin Simon, Ernest Hahn, Alfred Taubman, and the
Rouse Company to mention the largest firms) .6 All of these
developers have successfully accessed the capital markets
through security offerings. When Melvin Simon offered his $145
million REIT on the American Stock Exchange in 1988, Goldman
6 These owner/managers also own and manage community centers.
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Sachs, the lead underwriter, said the issue sold in a matter of
days due in part to investors' confidence in Melvin Simon. In
Hahn's financing of the Corte Madera Shopping Center in Marin
County, the issue was over subscribed in a matter of days,
presumably for the same reason. [9]
In addition, in rated transactions the rating agency
considers the quality of management to be very important. Many
of the rating criteria relate to areas strongly influenced by
management such as leasing, renovations, and expense control, or
other areas that have direct impact on cash flow. Even in
unrated transactions, ongoing collateralization levels, often
driven by financial ratio tests, are important guidelines
management must consider to retain investor confidence. [7,8]
Finally, as noted earlier, the bulk of Japanese investments
in U.S. real estate have been in highly visible office buildings
or trophy resort hotels. Particularly when they would be
investing in an unfamiliar asset class, it makes sense, from an
underwriter's perspective, to stick with a tried and true
formula. Regional shopping centers offer the most analogous
"quality of investment" to these office buildings and hotels.
According to Hirokazu Minamida at Nomura Securities one
reason why investors have not bought retail real estate is a
function of investors unfamiliarity with the product. However,
this product has potential as an asset class for Japanese
investors, but it will take some time to educate investors on
the concept of retail real estate and its performance relative
to office and hotels. [36] From a diversification perspective,
Japanese investment in retail shopping centers is logical. With
less than 4% of Japanese investment going into retail since
1985, diversifying investment dollars in the U.S. away from
office and hotel and into retail shopping centers should help
lower volatility of Japanese U.S. real estate portfolios and
increase their yields. [27,35]
Risks of Investing In Regional Shopping Centers
Although, as outlined here, there are many reasons why
regional shopping centers may be good candidates for
securitization, there are operating risks that are specific to
the underlying collateral of this asset class. In the last two
decades, regional shopping centers have been thought of as a
privileged asset class with superb fundamentals. Some
professionals now argue that the impressive regional shopping
center performance of the 1980s was an aberration, fueled by
consumer spending, department store expansion, and growing
markets. Some industry professionals such as David Shulman of
Salomon Brothers Inc., believe regional center performance in
the 1990s might not continue to be as strong as it has been in
the past. According to Shulman, there are several factors that
might portend trouble for the industry during the 1990s [46]:
(1) National recession. At present the US faces a recession
which could end as early as the third quarter 1991. If the
recession drags on, retail sales could fall thus compromising
retail tenant's ability to meet their rent obligations. A
recession, while hurting all real estate values, could be
particularly difficult for regional mall anchor tenants who are
already heavily leveraged resulting from many of the LBOs of the
1980s.
(2) Excess Capacity. Unfortunately, from 1987 to 1990 retail
construction contracts fell at a slower pace than the decline in
retail sales. For example, the percentage change in
construction contracts fell from 8.0% in 1987 to 6.0% while the
change in retail sales fell from 6.0% to 2.0% indicating more
supply was added during a period when retail sales did not
support these additions. Moreover, competition in this segment
has become more intense with the addition of competing retail
products. With the introduction of hypermarts, outlet stores,
membership clubs, and discount centers, regional shopping
centers are having to compete more aggressively for customers
who are time-value customers. [18,26]
(3) Shift in Income Distribution. During the 1980s, several
industries such as financial services, legal services, defense
production, entertainment, and real estate were associated with
high per worker levels of compensation. These industries are
for the most part in a state of restructuring, which implies
income will stop shifting to these higher paid sectors of the
economy. Unfortunately, during the 1980s many upscale regional
shopping centers were built to target this customer. With lower
disposable income, these sectors will probably look to other
low-cost means of retail consumption. As the consumption
pattern of consumers changes and shoppers become more value and
time-conscious, then this pattern will have an adverse impact,
particularly on the high-end shopping centers.
(4) Transfer of Power from Owners to Tenants. As the retail
industry restructures, many smaller tenants are achieving
anchor-like status in regional malls. Some of these tenants,
including The Limited, Gap Stores, Woolworth, and Melville are
successfully negotiating lower rents from owners and gaining co-
tenancy clauses with major anchors. Their new-found power is a
result of these tenants now becoming the major draw for shopping
centers. This does not appear to be a trend that will reverse
any time in the near future.
(5) Retail Restructuring. Major department stores continue
to operate in a difficult and complicated environment.
Suffering from extraordinary debt burdens, falling consumption,
and management turmoil, department stores will continue to
muddle through the recession. This restructuring has hit all
major retailers to some degree and may, in turn, negatively
impact the performance of the regional centers.
(6) Low Going-In Capitalization Rates. At their peak
regional shopping centers traded at capitalization rates of 5%.
Investors paid handsomely for these assets because they believed
in the potential for income growth to support a before-fee total
returns of 9.5%-10.5%, over a ten-year holding period. As
retail sales slow and tenants negotiate lower rents, investors
will demand higher yields to compensate them for these higher
risks. Yields on regional shopping centers should then be
expected to rise. (20]
These six market conditions have already made the
securitization process quite onerous. For example, early this
year when Goldman Sachs took on the assignment to raise $500
million for Investco to finance its acquisition of the Saks
Fifth Avenue Department Store chain for $1.6 billion, Goldman
underwrote the transaction but was left with $300 million of
floating rate AAA rated notes it could not syndicate. While
Goldman will ultimately be able to sell down the issue, a few
years ago, according to industry observers, such issues sold out
in a number of days. (21]
To the extent, however, that these factors impact one segment
of the retail industry more than another, it seems likely that
the regional mall sector of the shopping center industry will be
hurt the least. This is so because, as noted earlier, regional
centers make up such a small percentage of all retail centers
and tend to be located in higher-income areas. Based on their
fundamentals of being well-located, designed, occupied, and
managed, regional centers could be of even more interest to
investors now as compared to other real estate asset classes.
Stated differently, holding regional centers in a securitized
form for the long term, despite these market concerns, may be a
better investment decision than holding other assets such as
suburban offices, warehouses, or strip shopping centers.
Summary
This chapter has analyzed the performance of retail assets
relative to other commercial assets in an effort to determine
whether retail outperforms the others. The historical analysis
suggests that it does. This chapter also discussed whether
retail assets lend themselves more readily than do other
commercial assets, to designing a security for the Japanese
investment market. Concluding that they do so lend themselves,
the final section of this chapter discusses why regional
shopping centers appear to be the best category of retail for
such investments.
CHAPTER 3
PERFORMANCE OF REGIONAL SHOPPING CENTER SECURITIES
In Chapters 1 and 2 this paper demonstrated that Japanese
investors are in an attractive position relative to U.S. sources
of capital to finance regional shopping centers. In the next
two chapters, this paper studies two existing shopping center
securities and four alternative structures in an effort to offer
underwriters guidance on how to design a security that maximizes
investment performance for Japanese investors.7
There are two strategic issues which are critical for any
underwriter considering structuring a real estate security
composed of regional shopping centers. First, should assets be
pooled or financed individually? And second, if the security is
offered privately, which financial structure -- debt, equity or
a hybrid -- maximizes performance for the investor? Issue one
is the subject of this chapter. Issue two will be discussed in
Chapter 4.
Selection of Securities for Evaluation
Since very little data exists to compare the performance of
7 As Stephen Roulac points out in his article, "Designing Real
Estate Securities", despite demand in the 1980s, underwriters did
not design products that the market needed.
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privately-held regional shopping center securities, a
methodology was created that used data available from public
markets to approximate the performance of privately-held
regional center securities. Taking the historical information
from these public securities, a computer model was created that
simulates the performance of private MBSs for regional centers
and allows the author to evaluate the performance of both a
single-asset security and a pooled-asset security.
To create this computer model several things were done.
First, all public securities that had regional shopping centers
in their portfolios were reviewed, in an attempt to select a
representative single-asset security and a representative
pooled-asset security. The selection process for the pooled
security was limited to those securities where:
1. no less than 75% of the assets were regional shopping
centers,
2. no more than 30% of the assets were invested in mortgages,
3. the portfolio was geographically diverse,8
4. the management was stable,9 and
5. no more than 55% of capital was debt.
On this basis, the 1990 Moody's Investor Service Publication,
Public Realty Trusts and Limited Partnerships was reviewed. [37]
Two single-asset shopping center securities (EQK Green Acres
M.L.P. and Equitable REIT) were identified as possible
8 Geographically diverse for purposes of this research was
defined as not having more than 30% of the assets held in any
specific region of the U.S.
9 Each security's management was assessed to determine if,
during the study period, senior management remained in place and
did not change due to a buy out or other major transaction.
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representative "single-asset securities" and two other
securities (First Union Real Estate Trust and Western REIT) were
identified as possible representative "multiple-asset"
securities. From this sample, EQK Green Acres M.L.P. (EQK) and
First Union Real Estate Trust (First Union) were selected. EQK
was selected because Equitable REIT had two large regional
shopping centers as opposed to one. Although neither First
Union nor Western REIT met all the selection criteria exactly,
First Union was selected because it was more geographically
diverse than was the Western REIT.
Description of Securities
EQK Green Acres M.L.P.
EQK is a closed-end, self-liquidating master limited
partnership that owns and operates the Green Acres Mall, an
enclosed regional shopping mall consisting of about 1.4 million
gross leasable square feet located on 93 acres in Long Island,
New York. Built in 1958 and renovated in 1983, the center's
major tenants include Sears, Gimbels, Sterns, and JC Penney.
These four anchor tenants occupy 53% of the gross leasable area
(GLA) -or 713, 000 square feet, while approximately 150 mall
tenants and outparcel tenants occupy the balance. Managed and
owned by a partnership between Equitable and Kravco, the center
has, since 1986, maintained an average occupancy of 98%, an
average sales per square foot of $267, and an average rent per
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square foot of $24.65. The Urban Land Institute's 1990
statistics on super regional malls indicated that they
generated, on average, $210.67 per square foot. [10,11,47]
The partnership purchased the mall on August 12, 1986 for
$136 million. At that time, the purchase was financed with a
$104-million (face amount) zero-coupon bond. The initial amount
of the bond was $44 million. The remainder of the purchase
price was funded by a $93-million limited partnership offering.
[11]
Exhibit 3.1, presents EQK's operating history from 1987
through 1990. EQK has regularly increased its distribution at
a compounded annual growth rate of 4.46%. 10 From 1987 to 1989,
the unit price increased from $10.70 to $12.00 and then fell in
1990 to $10.30. From 1987 to 1990 the distribution increased
from $1.10 to $1.31 per unit. The distribution yield fell from
1987 to 1988, indicating that the unit price increased at a
faster rate than distributions rose over that period. From 1989
to 1990, the dividend yield rose because the unit price
fell. [11]
The offering memorandum projected an annual yield of 7.5% for
unit holders, which has been exceeded every year. This growth
in yield was particularly rewarding for investors on an after-
tax basis, given that the depreciation and amortization of the
zero-coupon bond ensured that almost 100% of the return was tax
10 Cash distributions from a MLP are distributions. Cash
distributions from a REIT are dividends.
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EXHIBIT 3.1
EQK Performance Measures
As of Year End
1987 1988 1989 1990
Net Operating Income (000) $11,300 $12,500 $13,000 $13,733
Net Income (000) $3,600 $4,300 $4,500 $4,400
Distributions per Unit $1.10 $1.16 $1.25 $1.31
Distribution Yield 10.28% 9.28% 10.42% 12.72%
Debt as a Percent of Capital 26.00% 30.00% 40.30% 40.10%
Return on Unitholders Equity 3.70% 4.50% 4.45% 4.52%
Unit Price $10.70 $12.50 $12.00 $10.30
Source: Author's calculations based on company 100 and 10K reports.
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deferred. EQK's low leverage ratio (40% in 1990) is of course
a result of the zero-coupon bond which makes high distributions
possible. Although return on unit holders' equity" increased
from 3.70% to 4.52% from 1987 to 1990, it was low compared to
distribution yield because of the heavy amortization of the
zero-coupon bond each year. This seemingly high distribution
yield can also be explained by looking at the trend of both the
unit price and the distribution, plotted in Exhibit 3.2. Since
1987, the unit price has remained, on a quarterly basis,
relatively close to its original offering price of $10.00. This
trading range indicates that the stock is fairly insensitive to
major movements in the stock market such as the crash in October
1987, where stocks lost approximately 20% of their value. One
reason for why EQK's unit price held firm during the crash may
have been the strength of its NOI and the amount of tax benefits
the investor received. Since the 1987 crash, the shopping
center has experienced low vacancy, little tenant turnover, a
backlog of tenants wishing to lease space, an aggressive
expansion program, strong increases in retail sales per year
(6.7%), and one of the highest non-anchor tenant sales per
square foot ($350) of any center in the country. [10] All of
these factors undoubtedly contribute to EQK's continued growth
1 Return on unit holders' equity is defined as net income
divided by unit holder equity. Unit holders' equity equals net
worth at the end of the year, as per the balance sheet.
12 Adjusted for conventional debt, the yield would average
approximately 6% for the period, according to Salomon Brothers.
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Exhibit 3.2
ECK QUARTERLY SHARE PRICE
EQK QUARTERLY DIVIDEND
8i:1 87:3 88:1 8:3 1 89:1 89:3 1 90:1 90:3 1
87:2 87:4 88:2 88:4 89:2 89:4 90:2 90:4
EQK QUARTERLY NOI
Time
Source: Company 10K and 10Q Reports
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in NOI. These increases in NOI and distributions, combined
with the high yield and tax benefits, might explain why EQK's
stock held relatively steady during the period despite a stock
market crash, upheaval in the retailing industry, and general
decline in real estate values nationwide.
In Exhibit 3.3, the net asset value of EQK is calculated to
compare the underlying asset values to the stock market
valuation in order to estimate to what extent the security
trades at a premium or discount relative to the value of the
underlying real estate asset. This performance measure,
although rough, should be helpful in determining why investors
might choose to invest directly in real estate as opposed to
purchasing a real estate security. Market valuations are
relatively straight forward; they are calculated by multiplying
the number of shares outstanding by the share price at the end
of the quarter for each security. Net asset values, however,
are less easily calculated because the underlying illiquidity of
the asset and its infrequent trading make it difficult to
determine a true market price. As a result, net asset values
must be estimated. In this study, the net asset value is
estimated for each quarter by dividing the NOI of the asset by
an income capitalization rate. NOI, as opposed to net earnings,
is used because with many real estate securities being privately
placed and trading infrequently, investors tend to evaluate them
more like direct investments (using NOI) than public securities
Exhibit 3.3
STOCK MARKET DISCOUNT FROM NET ASSET
VALUE AS A PERCENTAGE BY QUARTER
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Source: Author's Calculations Based on Company 1 OQ and 10K Reports.
(using net earnings), according to many underwriters.13
There are four problems with this method of calculating net
asset value that should be mentioned. One problem with this
method is that capitalization rates used in this study were
averages of capitalization rates tracked by life insurance
companies originating mortgage loans, and, as such, reflect
average rates for all geographic regions not just the specific
markets for the assets analyzed here. A second problem with
these capitalization rates is that they also reflect commitments
on mortgages, sometimes 2 years in the future, which could cause
cap rates to be higher. Perhaps the biggest problem with this
approach, individually for First Union as well as comparatively,
is the fact that a portion of First Union's NOI comes from non-
retail sources. First Union's "mixed" NOI means that the cap
rates used in this study track EQK better than they do First
Union. A fourth issue with these cap rates is that, being
averages, they do not account at all for the quality of shopping
center management. This becomes a problem when comparing net
asset value with market value because stock prices do reflect
the quality of management.
A more general problem with this comparative approach is
13 Most bond indentures require annual appraisals to determine
collateral levels. The rating of the indenture often occurs
annually. In both cases, NOI is the cash flow valued by S&P and
the independent appraisal firms as compared to net income. [8]
14 Rates taken from the American Life Insurance Council (ALIC) ,
an industry organization which tracks income cap rates for all
asset types. Only rates from the retail data set were used.
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that it does not adjust for the fact that securities are much
more liquid than direct investments and that real estate
securities typically have higher dividend or distribution yields
(and thus lower stock prices) than other equities.
A final problem with this approach is that the capitalization
rates provided by ALIC do not distinguish between sizes of
regional centers. For example, super regional malls might have
capitalization rates that are lower than other regional centers,
and yet the ALIC data do not make this distinction.
With these qualifications in mind, net asset value was
compared to market value. As Exhibit 3.3 suggests, the value of
the assets in EQK are undervalued by the stock market, on
average, by 26.11% with a low of 15% in 1987 and a high of 48%
in 1990. Over this time period, the discount has grown,
possibly reflecting the stock market's relatively recent
disenchantment with real estate stocks.
Having analyzed the performance of EQK using traditional
indicators, the mean return, the standard deviation, and the
coefficient of variation, are now presented in Exhibit 3.4.
Exhibit 3.4
Quarterly Total Returns to EQK Green Acres
(1986:4-1990:4)
Mean% STD% CV.
EQK 2.21 9.69 4.38
RN Index 1.33 0.86 0.65
S&P 500 2.11 8.81 4.18
Source: Author's calculations based on EQK 10K and 10Q reports.
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As shown in Exhibit 3.4, EQK's performance was similar to the
S&P 500 but was considerably poorer than RN. The RN index is,
however, heavily weighted toward office buildings (which are
currently overbuilt) and, for all of the reasons mentioned in
the previous chapter, it may not be a particularly good index
for comparison. Although EQK has a similar return to that of
the S&P 500, it is more volatile. This volatility can be
understood better by separating return into individual return
components of income and capital appreciation which is shown in
Exhibit 3.5. For example, the mean return for EQK's income
component was 2.72% with a standard deviation of 0.31%,
compared to the mean return for the capital component which was
-0.5% with a standard deviation of 9.94%.
Exhibit 3.5
Quarterly Returns By Income and Capital
to EQK Green Acres
(1986:4-1990:4)
Income Capital
Mean% STD% MEAN% STD%
EQK 2.72 0.31 -0.5 9.94
Source: Author's calculations based on EQK 10K and 10Q reports.
Clearly, the volatility was in the capital component, a common
case with real estate securities. The strong growth in the
income component is not met with a corresponding growth in share
price. Given the previously discussed appraisal problems with
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the RN index, it is probably more meaningful to compare EQK to
S&P than to RN. Such a comparison, suggests that EQK's unit
prices are only slightly more volatile than rest of the market.
Next, risk-adjusted rates of return are calculated for EQK
because investors consider them an important criteria by which
to measure performance. Using a simple form of the Capital
Asset Pricing Model, EQK's excess return (above the market as
measured by the S & P 500) and sensitivity to systematic risk 15
(as measured by the degree of movement the security displays
relative to the S&P 500)16 is calculated.
EQK's risk-adjusted rate produces an excess quarterly return
of 2.09% and a low beta of -0.17. Since neither of these
measures are statistically significant at the 95% level, no
statement can be definitively made about how EQK's return
perform's relative to the market. Even though the beta is not
statistically significant, its low value is consistent with the
observed low volatility of its unit price. The fact that EQK
has a low beta suggests that the asset's performance is not
influenced by the stock market's performance. Investors
purchasing EQK may be purchasing the stock because they have an
expectation that their investment will behave similar to a
15 Systematic risk is the amount of market risk a security
demonstrates compared to its unsystematic or company-specific risk.
The index used in this analysis was the S&P 500.
16 Degrees of movement relative to the S&P 500 are measured by
negative or positive values with -1 indicating that the security
moves in the opposite direction as from the S&P 500 and 1
indicating that the security moves in perfect correlation with the
S&P. This measure is known as a beta.
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direct real estate investment. These investors may be
evaluating the stock on the basis of its real estate
fundamentals, the high, tax-sheltered dividend it pays and the
liquidity it offers.
First Union Real Estate Investment Trust
First Union is a real estate investment trust which invests
primarily in enclosed regional shopping centers throughout the
U.S. Organized in 1961, the Trust owns 17 shopping centers,
seven office buildings, and 1 apartment complex. The shopping
centers have a total square footage of 7.6 million. Two of the
centers are larger than 800,000 square feet and 11 are in excess
of 400,000 square feet. Only four centers contain less than
400,000 square feet. The average square footage of each center
in the portfolio is 447,000 square feet. The retail component
of the Trust comprises 82% of the total square feet of its
holdings dispersed throughout the U.S: 35% in the midwest, 30%
in the east, 20% in the south, and 15% in the west. Similar to
EQK, the major retail anchor tenants include JC Penney, Sears,
and Macy's. Since 1986, the average weighted occupancy of the
centers has been 82%, while the weighted average sales per
square foot has averaged approximately $166. Additionally, the
Trust makes participating mortgage investments in retail centers
and, in 1990, these investments represented 21% of the total
book value of the assets. The office buildings, in 1990,
totaled 1.5 million square feet with an average size of 375,000
square feet per building and represented 16% of the total
portfolio. Since 1986, the office investment component has
dropped steadily from approximately 25% to its current level. In
1989 it represented 20.2% of the book value of the
assets. [14,17]
As of year-end 1990, the Trust had total book value assets
of $378 million, debt of $199 million, and shareholder equity of
$134 million, 59.7% as a percent of capital. Since 1986
leverage has averaged 55%. Because First Union is a REIT it is
exempt from Federal taxation so long as it has at least 100
shareholders, no more than 50% of its shares are owned by 5 or
fewer individuals, it distributes 95% of its net annual taxable
earnings, it derives 75% of its annual gross income from real
estate activities, and it holds at least 75% of its total
invested assets in real estate. [3]
Exhibit 3.6, presents First Union's operating history from
1986 through 1990. As shown, First Union increased its dividend
from $1.45 to $1.50 per share from 1986 to 1987 and then held
the dividend constant at $1.50 through 1990, resulting in almost
no growth over the study period (compounded annual growth rate
of 1.45%). During this same period, the dividend yield
increased from 5.80% in 1986 to 20.55% in 1990 (a compounded
annual growth rate of 28.7%) solely due to a dramatic 75% fall
in stock price from $25.00 to $7.30 during the period. Before
1986, First Union's stock had increased steadily from $11.00
per share in 1978 to $30.00 per share in the third quarter
Exhibit 3.6
First Union Performance Measures
As of Year End
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Net Operating Income (000) $46,684 $47,066 $45,124 $47,583 $46,772
Net Income (000) $25,496 $26,016 $23,398 $30,004 $20,865
Dividends $1.45 $1.50 $1.50 $1.50 $1.50
Dividend Yield 5.80% 8.29% 8.24% 9.20% 20.55%
Debt as a Percent of Capital 53.00% 57.00% 50.00% 54.00% 59.00%
Return on Stockholders Equity 20.70% 21.20% 20.50% 27.00% 15.70%
Stock Price $25.00 $18.10 $18.20 $16.30 $7.30
Source: Author's calculations based on company 10K and 100 reports.
of 1986. NOI was relatively stable compared to net income.
From 1986 to 1990 NOI grew at a compounded annual rate of 0.04%
while net earnings fell at a compounded annual growth rate of -
3.93%. These trends are plotted in Exhibit 3.7. In 1989 the
company had an extraordinary gain of $12.7 million as a result
of the sale of an office building in Atlanta, inflating net
income enormously for that year. From 1989 to 1990 when NOI
fell by only 2.0%, net income fell by 44% due to the fact that
no large assets were sold in 1990 and, therefore, no
extraordinary gain was recorded. This dramatic drop in net
income could be one explanation of why the stock price fell so
dramatically from 1989 to 1990 despite a stable level of NOI.
Although NOI is a more accurate assessment of the operating
health of a real estate company than is net income, if the stock
market values First Union on a net income basis instead of NOI,
dramatic differences in price and value could occur. Management
feels the that stock market substantially under-values the
company's assets. Donald S. Schofield, Chairman of First Union
stated in 1989 that, "Although there has been no fundamental
change in Trust's operations, the share price has declined along
with share prices of other real estate investment trusts. This
decline may be attributed to overbuilding ... , liquidation of
real estate assets at bargain prices by troubled thrifts, and
the overall slowdown of the national economy." [14] Comparing
the net asset value of the company to the market value
substantiates Schofield's assertions. Using the same method as
1.47
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Exhibit 3.7
FIRST UNION QUARTERLY SHARE PRICE
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for EQK, Exhibit 3.3 reveals that the market value is 35% less
than the capitalized value of the real estate. In addition to
the fundamental problems with this valuation method, discussed
in the previous section, there is the additional problem here
that not all of the First Union cash flows are derived from
shopping centers. Also, the trust does not separate cash flow
by real estate asset type or by book value in its publicly
reported data. As a way to adjust for these different cash
flows, a weighted average capitalization rate is used.
Beginning in 1986, the portfolio composition per year is used to
weight the capitalization rates taken from the ALIC for each
asset category (retail and office) .'
Despite this relatively high discount of 35%, an investor who
understands the historic trend of First Union's NOI might
consider the stock an attractive investment. Being able to buy
real estate assets that are undervalued due to market
imperfections, may be one of the many advantages of financing a
real estate security in the private markets as compared to the
public markets.
17 Since no public information was available for the book value
of the assets except for 1989, the percentage of square footage of
the total portfolio represented by each asset type was used to
weight the capitalization rate each year. Had book values for the
assets been availble for each year, the composition of the
portfolio would have been determined using that data.
Furthermore, since mortgage interest income is not separated by
asset type in the publicly available information, the captalization
rate used for interest income is the same as the other assets.
Since this method could understate or overstate net asset value,
comparisons to other securities or other indexes must be qualified.
Having analyzed the performance of First Union using
traditional indicators, the statistical measures of performance
-- mean return, standard deviation, and coefficient of variation
-- presented in Exhibit 3.8 are now discussed.
Exhibit 3.8
Quarterly Total Returns to First Union REIT
(1986:4-1990:4)
Mean % STD % CV.
First Union -7.21 18.23 -2.35
RN Index 1.33 0.86 0.65
S&P 500 2.11 8.81 4.18
Source: Author's calculations based on company 10K and 10Q
reports.
Compared to the S&P 500 and the RN, First Union was an under
performer. This relatively negative performance can be better
understood by separating return into individual components of
income and capital. For example, the mean quarterly return for
the income component of First Union's return was 2.23% (with a
standard deviation of 0.85%), compared to the mean return for
the capital component, of -9.44% (with a standard deviation of
18.85%).
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Exhibit 3.9
Quarterly Returns By Income and Capital
to First Union
(1986:4-1990:4)
Income Capital
Mean% STD% MEAN% STD%
First Union 2.33 0.85 -9.44 18.85
Source: Author's calculations based on Company 10K and 10Q
reports.
Calculating First Union's risk-adjusted return reveals a
figure of -10.53% and more volatility than the S&P 500 as
indicated by a beta of 1.28. Both these measures were
statistically significant at the 95% level. In other studies
First Union's beta, for the period 1973 through 1988 has been
calculated to have been between .86 and .92. [3] The relatively
high beta calculated by this author's study is not surprising
considering that it was calculated for the period 1986 - 1990
(which can be described as a low growth portion of the real
estate cycle) and that one study has discovered that the betas
of REITs exceed 1 during recessionary times. [3,42] The
extremely negative excess return is a result of the enormous
drop in share price during this time.
Comparing the Returns of EQK and First Union
Although the basis for selecting these two securities was
to try to choose two assets -- one a single-asset regional
center security, the other a multiple-asset retail security -
- to compare performance, such comparisons are problematic in
many ways.
The first problem is the size of the sample from which the
securities were selected. Unfortunately there was only one
single-asset real estate security and only two multiple-property
regional center securities from which to select. Therefore, it
becomes difficult to make general statements regarding the
performance of all single-asset vs. multiple-asset securities.
For example, EQK's location in a wealthy northeast suburb could
have a lot to do with its exceptional performance.
The second problem is the difficulty of controlling quality
of management across entities. Ideally, for the study to
eliminate this difference, both a single-asset security and a
multiple-property security should have the same management.
Although this was not the case here, each security did have
stable, well-regarded management, throughout the time period.
The third problem, and most important, is that each of these
securities are organized differently. EQK is a master limited
partnership; First Union is a REIT. Both REITs and MLPs are
valued very differently by investors. MLPs, like typical real
estate partnerships, are allowed to pass through taxable losses
such as depreciation and bond amortization to limited partners.
These losses are not passed through to investors in a REIT.
Because EQK is financed with a zero-coupon bond, this difference
is amplified because each year a large amount (approximately
$1.4 million) of the bond is amortized. This amortization
combined with the depreciation of the mall almost totally
shelters the unitholder's distributions from taxation, thereby,
increasing his total return on an after tax-basis. First Union
investors do not have this benefit; their dividend
distributions, to the extent that they do not represent a return
of capital, are subject to taxation. As a result of this key
difference, EQK's stock should be more desirable to investors
independent of the operating performance of the underlying real
estate. Because an adjustment for this difference cannot be
made, it is likely that the results of this study overstate
EQK's performance, from a real estate perspective, relative to
that of First Union.
The last problem making it difficult to compare these
securities is that First Union represents a mixed-asset
portfolio.
Given these limitations, the income components of the return
is probably the only meaningful way to compare the securities.
Comparing the income component of EQK with that of First Union,
reveals that performance is quite similar.
Exhibit 3.10
Comparison of Statistical Measures of Quarterly Performance
EQK and First Union
(1986:4-1990:4)
Income Component
Mean% STD% CV.
EQK 2.72
First Union 2.23
RN 1.68
S&P 500 2.11
Source: Author's calculations
reports.
0.31
0.85
0.06
8.81
taken from
0.11
0.38
0.04
4.18
company 10K and 10Q
Based on the individual performance results of the two
securities, it is not surprising that EQK outperformed First
Union with respect to the coefficient of variation. In terms
of this measure, neither security outperforms the RN, perhaps
because the income yield calculation depends upon the stock
price which, because of its volatility, adds more volatility to
the income yield than what the RN captures. Furthermore, as
mentioned earlier the RN coefficient is likely to be understated
because of the appraisal-bias problems.
Conclusions
Evaluating the performance of EQK and First Union has shown
that the volatility of the income component of the return for
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both EQK and First Union outperformed that of the S&P 500 and
under performed the RN. Although other performance measures
suggest that EQK outperformed First Union, the limitations
detailed in this chapter prohibit a generalization to be made
that single-asset regional shopping centers securities
outperform pooled-asset regional shopping center securities.
one of the main reasons why an accurate comparison cannot be
made is the lack of information which permits the mixed-asset
portfolio of First Union to be properly analyzed.
Based on these results, the analysis indicates that the
public markets probably do not accurately value the underlying
real estate in both EQK and First Union. As noted, this under-
valuation is something that underwriters should consider when
deciding whether to issue a security in the public market or the
private market. With such a large difference in value, it is
likely that the private markets would generate greater proceeds
for issuers.
CHAPTER 4
REGIONAL SHOPPING CENTER SECURITY SIMULATION
Introduction
In the previous chapters it was determined that an
opportunity existed for Japanese investors to invest in U.S.
regional shopping centers and that real estate securities would
be an efficient way for Japanese investors to acquire such
centers. If this is the case, then understanding which real
estate security structures maximize return while minimizing
volatility should be important for investors. Thus, the focus
of this chapter will be to evaluate four representative real
estate security structures in an effort to determine which type
of security, if issued privately and marketed to Japanese
investors, would offer the best financial return. Due to the
lack of publicly available information for private securities,
a computer model was developed to simulate the performance of
the four real estate security structures, using the historical
NOIs of the two securities analyzed in Chapter 3 (EQK and First
Union). The results of these simulations should enable
underwriters to evaluate more effectively than before, which
security structures will produce the highest returns with the
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lowest volatility when the securitized assets are regional
shopping centers.
Financial Structures and Structuring Issues
Since 1987, many equity-oriented foreign investors who have
invested in trophy properties have chosen to use convertible and
participating mortgage investments as opposed to direct equity
investments. [30] In a convertible mortgage, the lender agrees
to lend at a fixed, below-market interest rate18 in exchange for
an option to convert all or a portion of the loan into an
equity position at some later date. A participating mortgage is
similar in that the lender also agrees to accept a fixed, below-
market rate of interest. In exchange, however, instead of
granting the lender a conversion option, the borrower agrees to
pay the lender contingent interest, based on the asset's cash
flow and/or to make additional payments that are related to the
property's appreciated value, when the principal is due. By
accepting a below-market current yield in either of these
instruments, the lender, in effect, trades current yield for
potentially greater total yield. This trade-off can be
advantageous for a borrower because with low current interest
rates, he can produce a pro forma that justifies a higher level
of debt on the asset and he can, therefore, raise more
financing. Another advantage to the borrower is that such a
18 Below-market in terms of conventional mortgage rates.
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structure shifts a significant amount of the risk associated
with the asset's economic performance to the lender. For
example, if the asset's NOI does not meet projections, or if the
property does not appreciate, the value of the conversion option
or the participation in the residual diminishes and the lender's
overall yield suffers. Additionally, if the property
depreciates, the lender runs the risk that, at the end of the
mortgage term, there may not be adequate take-out financing
available. On the other hand, the structure does offer the
lender the advantage of preserving a first lien on the asset
which would not be possible in the case of an equity investment.
In addition, if the asset performs, as or better than expected,
the investor may be in a position to receive an equity-like
return with the security of mortgage debt. [12,30]
For Japanese investors willing to take on more risk than
that of a straight mortgage loan, these hybrid configurations
could be used to structure securities that offer them
potentially greater returns than those available with securities
structured as conventional debt. Since the Japanese have used
these two hybrid structures to invest in U.S. real estate [30],
they were the two selected to compare to leveraged and
unleveraged equity structures. Thus, the computer model used in
this chapter simulates the following four security structures:
(1) participating debt (PD), (2) convertible debt (CD), (3)
leveraged equity (LE), and (4) unleveraged equity (UE).
Of course, in structuring a real estate security for the
private market, there are many issues to consider beyond the
financial performance of the security, such as legal and tax
concerns, marketability and liquidity issues.
These issues are significant and the way in which they could
influence the decision to pursue one structure over another
cannot be overstated. For example, there are U.S. laws that
prevent or severely restrict investment by foreigners; nine
states completely prohibit such investment. The balance of
the states have some restrictions. [2]
In addition to the multitude of legal issues having an impact
on how a security should be structured, there are also
substantial tax issues that will have an impact. For example,
in 1980, Congress enacted the Foreign Investment in Real
Property Tax Act of 1980 (FIRPTA) meant to impose significant
burdens on foreign investors in U.S. property. One of the
consequences of the Act was to tax capital gains for foreign
investors at the same rate they were taxed for U.S. real estate
owners. (Prior to 1980 there was no U.S. capital gain tax on
investments made by foreigners.) Additionally, the Act required
foreign investors to pay U.S. withholding tax on any capital
gain earned in the U.S. According to Mark Eppli, Lecturer at
the University of Wisconsin, one result of FIRPTA is that
Japanese investors have used participating and convertible
mortgages to invest in U.S. real estate, as a way to avoid
paying capital gain and withholding taxes. [2]
19 The nine states are CN, IN, KN, MI, MO, NE, and OK.
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In addition to legal and tax issues there are other issues
that could affect an underwriter's selection of one structure
over another. For example, to the extent that an underwriter
perceives potential investors as preferring an equity investment
to a debt investment, the issuer is likely to prefer structuring
a leveraged or unleveraged equity security into a participating
or convertible mortgage instrument. In addition, to the extent
that a participating mortgage structure requires a certain type
of credit rating or enhancement which is unavailable, that
structure would have to be eliminated from consideration.
Finally, the transaction costs involved in issuing an equity
security are typically higher than those involved in issuing
debt instruments and could influence an underwriter to issue a
debt instrument as opposed to an equity security.
Methodology and Simulation Assumptions
To measure the hypothetical performance of the four financial
structures, the quarterly data from EQK and First Union (1986:4-
1990:4) were used to simulate the investor's total quarterly
return. This simulation was accomplished by taking the current
quarterly cash flow (income component of total return) received
by the investor, adding it to the change in the capital
component for that quarter, and then dividing that sum by the
market value of the bond or equity investment.20 (This method of
determining quarterly return, dependent as it is on the
estimated net asset value of an investment, is, as previously
noted, problematic.) The model assumed that the investment was
sold and reinvested the next quarter using the same financial
structure.21
For purposes of this chapter, the model evaluated performance
using the same statistical measures as before: mean return,
standard deviation, and coefficient of variation. The risk-
adjusted rates were not used as a method of comparison because
none of the rates calculated exhibited any statistical
significance at the 95% level.
The financial assumptions used for the simulation of EQK and
First Union are outlined in Exhibit 4.1. In all cases, the
financial results of the model are calculated on a before tax
basis. These assumptions were developed using historical
Treasury Bill rates and mortgage rates for regional shopping
center debt as well as the information contained in the
prospectuses of several real estate bond issues.
20 The cash flow the investor receives is NOI less any debt
service imposed by the simulated capital structure. Upon sale, the
residual value is calculated after the repayment of debt, if any.
Net asset value, as it is used here, refers to the same calculation
as in Chapter 3.
21 Transaction costs are assumed to be 3%. The cost of credit
enhancement and annual rating fees are not included.
This is done to maintain comparability between the
structures without the influence of withholding, capital gains, and
ordinary taxes on the return and volatility measures of the model.
Exhibit 4.1
Base Case
Simulation Model Assumptions
Fixed-Rate Equity
Loan-to- Base Participation
Structure Value Couoon Level (1)
Participating Debt 80.00% 8.00% 50.00%
Convertible Debt 80.00% 8.00% 50.00%
Leveraged Equity 70.00% 8.75% 100.00%
Unleveraged Equity 0.00% 0.00% 100.00%
(1) Equity participation level is the amount of equity participation the investor
shares in for each financial structure.
Source: Author's assumptions
In the case of the participating debt and convertible debt,
the security was assumed to have received an investment-grade
rating (A or better) by Duff & Phelps Inc., a nationally
recognized rating agency. To be so rated, Duff and Phelps
requires a security to have a debt coverage ratio of at least
1.25 and a loan-to-value ratio of at least 75%. In all quarters
of 1987, both EQK and First Union had loan-to-value and debt
service coverage ratios that would qualify for such a rating.
For example, EQK's debt service coverage was 1.45 and First
Union's was 1.41. The loan-to-values ratios for each were 80%.23
The fixed-rate base coupons for the model's participating
debt (8.00%), convertible debt (8.00%), and leveraged equity
(8.75%) structures were determined by adding 32, 32, and 107
basis points respectively, to the 10 year Treasury Bill rates
at year end in 1986. At that time the 3-year, 5-year and 10-
year Treasury bill rates were 7.06%, 7.31%, and 7.68%
respectively. The spread over Treasury rates was selected by
reviewing a transaction similar to that modeled here, the Corte
Madera Shopping Center located in Marin County, CA., and by
interviews with underwriters to discuss pricing. These
underwriters stated that the Corte Madera issue was likely the
most representative transaction near 1986 which was a $40
million bond rated AAA by S&P and priced at 9.68%, reflecting a
23 According to Goldman Sachs, a 75%-80% loan-to-value ratio
is common for hybrid structures and drops the base rate coupon
approximately 50-75 basis points below the straight market-rate
mortgage-backed security rate (approximately 100 basis points over
Treasury Bills in 1986).
spread of 83 basis point spread over the 10-year Treasury Bill
rate at that time (8.85%). These underwrites pointed out that
this was not a hybrid issue, and if it had been, the spread
would have been approximately 25-50 basis points over the
Treasury Bill.24 Based on these market rates, the base case
coupon rate for hybrid and leveraged equity simulations were
selected. These rates reflect the range for retail bond issues
offered in 1986. None of the structures assumed any bond
amortization since few hybrid bonds issued to date have any bond
amortization. [9,38] Later in this chapter, these rates along
with other structuring assumptions will be varied to evaluate
how sensitive each financial structure's return is to changes in
interest rates and equity participation levels.
The formulas used in the model to value the quarterly market
value of the bonds (participating mortgage and convertible
mortgage) as well as the option on the convertible mortgage are
detailed in Appendix 1. [48] For the participating and
convertible mortgages, the participation and convertible
features were initially structured with a 50% participation and
a 50% conversion option. This assumption was based on a
comparison of non-retail participating and convertible mortgages
that Goldman Sachs had previously marketed to Japanese
investors. Again, these levels will be varied in the
sensitivity analysis.
24 As a point of reference, the 10 year ALIC mortgage rate in
1986 was 10.00% for retail projects reflecting a spread of 232
basis points over the Treasury Bill.
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Since the model assumed that the security was sold at the end
of each quarter and then reinvested using the same structure,
the calculation of the income yield and the capital yield should
be explained. For the participating structure, when the bond
was sold each quarter, the income yield was calculated by taking
the current cash flow to the investor (interest income plus any
contingent interest) and dividing it by the market value of
the bond. The market value of the bond was determined using a
standard corporate finance technique for valuing bonds: the
formula for which is detailed in Appendix 1. [48] The market
value was determined by discounting the future interest income
(including contingent interest) of the bond back to the current
period. This present value was then added to the discounted
value of the face amount of the bond at maturity for the current
period. The sum of these two present values (the discounted
interest income stream and the discounted face amount of the
bond) represent the market value of the bond in the current
period. The discount rate selected, according to the formula,
should be the market interest rate for non-hybrid debt issues
of equivalent risk. For purposes of this model, the equivalent
non-hybrid debt instrument used was the comparable Treasury Bill
rate for the period, plus 100 basis points. (These rates were
chosen because they are close to high-grade corporate bond
yields, which are what investors will compare these securities
to.) [9,38]
The capital component for the participating debt was
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calculated by taking the change in the residual value each
quarter, and dividing it by the same denominator used for the
income component -- the market value of the bond.
The income and capital yield calculations for the convertible
debt were slightly different. Although the market value of the
bond, excluding the conversion option, was calculated exactly as
described previously, calculating the value of the option was
more complicated. To do so it was assumed that 50% of the
mortgage balance was converted to equity in the fourth quarter
of 1990. The residual value of the asset to the investor was
calculated by taking its net asset value, subtracting the
mortgage balance and the equity conversion value, and then
multiplying by 50%. The result was the value of the option.
Each quarter, the value of the option was discounted back from
its exercise date (1990:4) using the same discount rate as that
used in the participation calculations. (The formula for
valuing the option is detailed in Appendix 1.) As the option
approaches its exercise date, it rises in value. The value of
the conversion option is added to the market value of the debt,
because, in theory, a potential investor would be willing to pay
more for the debt if it contained an option on the future value
of the asset. The more the underlying asset is worth, the
greater the value of the option and the more an investor would
be willing to pay for the bonds.
The capital yield for the convertible debt was calculated by
taking the change in the value of the option each quarter, and
dividing it by the same denominator used for the income
component -- the market value of the bond. Depending upon the
value of the asset, the value of the option will change each
quarter which results in either a capital gain or loss to the
investor. At the exercise date, the value of the conversion
option is divided by the market value of both the debt and the
equity components, since the investor's role in the transaction
is that of both a lender and equity owner.
The leveraged equity income yield for each quarter was
calculated by taking the cash flow after debt service and
dividing it by the net asset value. The capital yield was
calculated by taking the change in each quarter's residual
value, divided by the net asset value. The residual value was
calculated by subtracting the repayment of the debt from the net
asset value.
As mentioned earlier, these assumptions will be varied to
test the sensitivity of each security relative to interest rates
and equity participation levels.
Performance Results
The next section evaluates the performance of each security
structure for both EQK and First Union and then compares the
results. In addition, the sensitivity of each structure to
different interest rates, levels of equity participation and
loan-to-value ratios is explored.
EQK
The quarterly total yields of the simulation model for EQK
are displayed in Exhibit 4.2. As shown in this exhibit, all
four structures have different levels of return and volatility
depending upon the security structure. These trends are
described statistically in Exhibit 4.3 which follows:
Exhibit 4.3
Simulated Quarterly Performance Results for EQK
(1986: 4-1990:4)
Mean STD CV.
Participating Debt 3.44 6.46 1.88
Convertible Debt 4.65 6.67 1.43
Leveraged Equity 3.59 20.95 5.83
Unleveraged Equity 3.00 8.28 2.76
Source: Author's calculations based on company 10K and 10Q
reports.
(1) Participating Debt
As Exhibit 4.3 shows, the PD structure has the second lowest
coefficient of variation of the group. This low coefficient of
variation occurs because the PD structure provided a stable
return over the period as indicated by its low STD. This
relative stability is due to the fact that PD, as compared to
Exhibit 4.2
EQK SIMULATED QUARTERLY RETURNS
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Source: Author's Calculations Based on Company 10K and 1OQ reports.
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equity, has a more secure residual return. This is so because
with a leveraged or unleveraged equity structure, the investor
is in a subordinated -- and thus more risky -- position vis a
vis the debt holder. Furthermore, since the contingent interest
typically is structured as a percentage of net operating income
after debt service, as it is here, it may have a more volatile
return than a straight mortgage instrument since a component of
the interest income for a participating mortgage is variable.
When the income and capital components of the PD's quarterly
return are evaluated separately, the amount of the return
generated from income is shown to be 2.50% and from capital to
be only 0.94% (See Exhibit 4.4) The standard deviations are
0.03% and 6.43% respectively. Since the PD generates a current
participation in cash flow and is in a senior position to
equity, it seems appropriate that the majority of the return
comes from income rather than residual. As will be shown, the
equity structures have more of the return shifted toward
capital. Although the capital component of the PD return is
volatile, it is less than that of the other structures.
(2) Convertible Mortgage
The convertible mortgage structure has the lowest coefficient
of variation of all the structures (see Exhibit 4.3). With V4h
respect to the income and capital components of the return for
CD, the model indicates that although the income return is the
lowest of the three structures, the capital return is the
highest. The income is lowest because the fixed-rate base
Exhibit 4.4
Simulated Performance of Income and Capital
For EQK and First Union
(1986:4-1990:4)
MEAN % STD %
Income Capital Income Capital
SECURITY
EQK
Participating Debt 2.50% 0.94% 0.03% 6.43%
Convertible Debt 1.82% 2.84% 0.12% 6.63%
Leveraged Equity 1.85% 1.74% 0.18% 20.77%
Unleveraged Equity 1.98% 1.02% 0.08% 8.20%
FIRST UNION
Participating Debt 2.41% 0.10% 0.03% 2.51%
Convertible Debt 1.91% 1.26% 0.09% 2.63%
Leveraged Equity 2.62% 0.04% 0.33% 11.16%
Unleveraged Equity 2.33% 0.12% 0.08% 3.15%
coupon does not rise in value the way the participating or
leveraged equity and unleveraged equity structures do. The
capital component is high because it reflects the quarterly
appreciation of the option and the equity return when the option
is exercised in the last quarter. These two factors also create
greater volatility for CD. While the income component
demonstrates little volatility, the capital component is more
volatile than the PD. This greater volatility is largely a
result of the option being exercised in the last quarter.
(3) Leveraged Equity
LE has the highest coefficient of variation of the three
structures. This high coefficient of variation is due to the
high standard deviation (20.99%) which is related to the capital
component of the security. This high standard deviation makes
sense given that LE investors face greater risk than those
investing in the other three structures because their position
is subordinated to that of the debt holders and the debt must be
serviced before the equity holders can receive a return. The
relatively low return on the income component is a function of
the capital structure. In the case of LE, the mortgage is fixed
at a market rate of interest, whereas in the hybrid structures
some of the risk is shifted to the lender by way of a below-
market interest rate. If the LE interest rate is lowered, as
will be shown, then the return for LE is higher than the other
structures except for CD.
(4) Unleveraged Equity
UE, the final structure evaluated, generates a coefficient
of variation that is higher than the two hybrid structures, but
lower than LE. (See Exhibit 4.3) The coefficient of variation
is higher than the hybrids' because although UE's total return
is lower (3.00% vs. 3.44% and 4.65%), the standard deviation is
higher (8.28% vs. 6.46% and 6.67%). Similar to LE, UE's capital
component of return is higher than the PD because when a
increase in value occurs, both LE and UE feel the full impact of
it, unlike the PD investors who share in only part of the
increase.
First Union
In Exhibit 4.5, the quarterly total returns for the four
security structures are graphed while Exhibit 4.6 displays the
statisitical performance measures for First Union.
Exhibit 4.6
Simulated Quarterly Performance Results for First Union
(1986:4-1990:4)
Mean STD A CV.
Participating Debt 2.51 2.54 1.01
Convertible Debt 3.21 2.66 0.83
Leveraged Equity 2.66 11.49 4.32
Unleveraged Equity 2.53 3.23 1.37
Source: Author's calculations based on company 10K and 10Q
reports.
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(1) Participating Debt
As Exhibit 4.6 shows, the PD structure has the second lowest
coefficient of variation of the group. This low coefficient of
variation occurs because the PD structure provided a stable
return over the period as indicated by the relatively low STD.
When the income and capital components of the PD's return are
evaluated, the amount of the return generated from income is
shown to be much higher than the capital component, while the
opposite is true for the standard deviation. Since the
participating mortgage generates a current participation in cash
flow, (unlike a convertible mortgage), and is in a senior
position to equity, it seems appropriate, as noted earlier, that
the majority of the return comes from income rather than
residual. The investor who wishes to have a more bond-like
investment (more current income) may find this investment more
suitable than the other three.
(2) Convertible Mortgage
The convertible mortgage structure has the lowest coefficient
of variation of the four structures (see Exhibit 4.6). This is
so because the convertible had a higher mean return due to the
rising value of the option as well as the option being exercised
in the last period. However, this option caused greater
volatility in the return than did the PD's participation in the
asset's residual value since the convertible option is more
similar to an equity investment than the residual of the
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participation.
With respect to the income and capital components of the
quarterly return, the model indicates that a substantial amount
of the return is generated by the capital component. The
capital component is higher than the other structures because
the investor can sell the option at a gain based on the positive
value of the residual. As the option approaches its exercise
price, investors are willing to pay more for the option since
its value is more certain. Furthermore, the higher volatility
of the CD's total return is attributable to the capital
component. This suggests that a CD structure (in addition to
a PD structure) behaves more like equity than a straight
mortgage instrument, by shifting a greater portion of the return
toward the future value of the asset.
(3) Leveraged Equity
LE has the highest coefficient of variation of the three
structures -- as it did in the EQK simulation -- largely due to
the high standard deviation. Unlike EQK, however, the high
total return is due almost entirely to the income component as
opposed to the capital component. This difference may be
explained by the fact that there were larger drops in the net
asset value of First Union than for EQK. These drops impact the
return on equity structures more than they do the return on
hybrid instruments.
(4) Unleveraged Equity
UE, the final structure evaluated, generates a coefficient
of variation that is higher than the two hybrid structures, but
lower than LE. (See Exhibit 4.6). The coefficient of variation
is higher than the PD's and CD's because while UE's total return
is the lowest, its standard deviation is higher than the
hybrids'. Similar to LE, UE has the same problem of a low
capital return. Again, these low capital returns suggest that
although equity investors may expect larger yields from capital
appreciation, the asset and the security do not meet this
expectation.
Comparison Between EQK and First Union
In both the EQK and First Union simulations, CD performed the
best and LE performed the worst. The return components for all
securities in both simulations ranged from a quarterly low of
2.35% (UE, First Union) to a high of 4.65% (CD, EQK). During
the simulation period (1986:4-1990:4) the mean quarterly yield
on comparable Treasury bills was only 2.37% meaning that the
majority of these structures beat the "risk-free" rate. Even
when 100 basis points were added to this Treasury yield to
increase the hurdle rate to 3.37%, the returns from all of EQK's
structures except UE exceeded it. These results reflect the
underlying operating strength of the Green Acres Mall. However,
despite the mall's strong cash flow, its return is almost two
times as volatile as First Union's, an event that should not be
unexpected, given that, in theory, the return on single assets
should be more volatile than on a portfolio of assets. [13]
These results suggest that underwriters should consider
pooling assets as a way to lower volatility. However, if an
underwriter were considering securitizing a single-asset, the
hybrid structures would be a way to lower the volatility of the
investment, while still providing a return to investors that
would be higher than an equity structure.
Sensitivity Analyis
To test the results of these simulations, key assumptions in
the model were varied. The assumptions varied were the interest
rate spread between hybrid debt and leveraged equity, the level
of equity participation and the loan-to-value ratios.
In the first case the spread between the hybrid structures
and the leveraged equity was changed from the base case of 75
basis points to a smaller spread of 25 basis points and a higher
spread of 100 basis points. The results of the sensitivity are
displayed in Exhibit 4.7. As shown, changing the spread between
the securities did not have a substantial impact on the
performance rankings of the securities. In both the low and the
high case, the coefficient of variation for the leveraged equity
did not change more than 6% in either direction. With a spread
of 25 basis points, however, the return is greater for LE than
other structures in both the EQK and First Union simulations.
In order for LE to have the lowest coefficient of variation the
EXHIBIT 4.7
Interest Rate
Sensitivity Analysis For Quarterly Simulation
For EQK and First Union
(1986:4-1990:4)
Base Case (1) Low Case High Case
(interest Rate (Interest Rate (Interest Rate
8.00% and 8.75%) 8.00% and 8.25%) 8.00% and 9.00%)
Mean% STD% CV. Mean% STD% CV. Mean% STD% CV.
SECURITY
FIRST UNION
Participating Debt 2.51% 2.54% 1.01 2.51% 2.54% 1.01 2.51% 2.54% 1.01
00 Convertible Debt 3.21% 2.66% 0.83 3.21% 2.66% 0.83 3.21% 2.66% 0.83
Leveraged Euy I,6% 1.49% 4-32 2,74% 1,48% 4.19 2,42% 11,50Q% 4,75
Unleveraged Equity 2.35%k 3.23% 1.37 2.35%h 3.23% 1.37 2.35%k 3.23%k 1.37
EQK
Participating Debt 3.44%h 6.46%k 1.88 3.44% 6.46%k 1.88 3.44% 6.46% 1.88
Convertible Debt 4.65%k 6.67%h 1.43 4.65% 6.67% 1.43 4.65% 6.67% 1.43
Unleveraged Equity 3.00% 8.28%k 2.76 3.00% 8.28%k 2.76 3.00% 8.28% 2.76
(1) The 8.00%M base coupon is the interest rate for the participating and convertible structures. The 8.75% interest rate represents the interest rate for
the leveraged equity structure. In each case ( low and high) the interest rate on the leveraged equity is varied.
base coupon rate would have to be less than the hybrid base
coupon, which does not make sense. Therefore, what the model
suggests is that changing the interest rate will not diminish
the volatility of the LE investment which in turn does not
change its ranking relative to the other securities.
In the second case, the results were tested by varying the
level of equity participation and the loan-to-value ratios of
each "base case" security. In this instance, the base case was
compared to a "high case" scenario where the equity
participation and conversion levels for the hybrids were
increased from 50% to 75% while the loan-to-value ratio for the
LE was increased from 70% to 75%. Because LE participation is
always 100%, the only way to model a "high case" or "low case"
is to change the loan-to-value. For the "low case" scenario,
the equity participation and conversion levels were decreased
from 50% to 25% while the LE loan-to-value was decreased from
70% to 60%. Exhibit 4.8 displays the results of the
sensitivity. If all the assumptions of the base case are held
constant except for the loan-to-value ratio of the leveraged
equity, the leveraged equity security achieves its optimal, or
lowest, coefficient of variation at a 65% loan-to-value,
however, its ranking to the other securities does not change.
At higher loan-to-value ratios its return diminishes
substantially due to the higher debt service.
This sensitivity analysis demonstrates that the hybrid
strultures outperform the equity structures even when return the
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Exhibit 4.8
Equity Participation (1)
Sensitivity Analysis For Quarterly Simulation
For EQK and First Union
(1986:4-1990:4)
Base Case Low Case
50% PartJ Lev. Eq. 70% 25% Part./Lev. Eq. 60%
Mean% STD% CV. Mean% STD% CV.
SECURITY
FIRST UNION
Participating Debt 2.51% 2.54% 1.01 2.29% 1.27% 0.55
Convertible Debt 3.21% 2.66% 0.83 2.66% 1.40% 0.53
Leveraged Equity 2.66% 11.49% 4.32 2.60% 8.47% 3.26
Unleveraged Equity 2.35% 3.23% 1.37
EQK
Participating Debt 3.44% 6.46% 1.88 2.77% 3.28% 1.18
Convertible Debt 4.65% 6.67% 1.43 3.37% 3.33% 0.99
Leveraged Equity 3.59% 20.95% 5.83 3.55% 17.25% 4.86
Unleveraged Equity 3.00% 8.28% 2.76
(1) Equity participation refers to the level of participation in cash flow or residual or the amount of debt that is converted
(2) Leveraged Equity percentage refers to loan-to-value ratio. Loan-to-value ratios for Participating Debt
and Convertible Debt are held constant at 80%.
High Case
75% Part./Lev Eq. 75%
Mean% STD%
2.73%
2.65%
2.49%
4.07%
5.20%
3.57%
3.73%
1.35%
14.03%
9.54%
10.19%
23.55%
into equity at conversion.
CV.
1.37
0.51
5.64
2.35
1.96
6.6
"base case" assumptions are varied.
Conclusion
Comparing the four security structures for both EQK and First
Union suggests that the hybrid structures have greater returns
with less volatility than do the equity structures. The hybrid
returns appear to be driven by the combination of the low
volatility of the fixed-rate base coupon plus the equity-like
returns of the participation and convertible features. Although
leveraged equity provided the second highest return, its return
was the most volatile of the group, due to its subordinated
nature.
These findings, suggest that in some circumstances, hybrid
structures may provide higher returns with less volatility than
the equity structures. This does not, however, suggest that
equity structures are not appropriate for certain investors.
Since every transaction must match the needs of the investor and
the issuer there are many reasons an equity structure may be
more approriate than hybrid structures. Furthermore, given the
limitations of this study, it is difficult to use these results
to generalize about structuring real estate securities for
Japanese investors in today's market. They do, however, offer
some guidance.
From the investor's perspective, these results suggest that
owners who make equity investments may not be compensated
adequately for the risks they are bearing. Given the choice
between a hybrid structure or an equity structure, purely from
a return and volatility perspective, the investor may be better
off selecting a hybrid structure.
This has implications for Japanese investors. If the
investor is seeking an equity return, then hybrid real estate
securities may generate similar yields as equity real estate
securities with the added security of being a senior mortgagee.
By shifting more of the yield toward the residual value of the
asset through a mortgage security, the investor may achieve
higher yields than he would with comparable Treasury or high-
grade, corporate bonds.
Additionally, as pointed out earlier, these instruments may
offer more tax and legal flexibility for Japanese investors as
compared to direct investment. [30] By using the participating
mortgage instrument in particular, investors could avoid paying
capital gains tax on the residual value, since it would be
treated as additional interest income. These instruments would
also allow Japanese investors to invest in those states where
direct ownership of real estate by foreigners is prohibited or
severely restricted. This factor becomes very important if the
investor were considering investing in a portfolio of properties
located throughout the U.S.
The following chapter will consider the implications of
these results for designing a regional-shopping-center-backed
security for Japanese investors.
CHAPTER 5
Conclusion
This paper has suggested that because of the current capital
shortage existing in the U.S. real estate market, Japanese
investors, despite the changing financial climate in Japan,
are well positioned to acquire and finance U.S. property. This
paper argues that, for the Japanese, real estate securities may
be the best method of so investing. Particular opportunities
exist for investment in retail assets, a segment of the market
in which the Japanese have not yet invested heavily. In
particular, regional shopping centers, due to their high
quality, large size, strong management, and healthy profits
offer attractive investment opportunities. In Chapter 4, the
performance of four hypothetical, privately placed security
structures was simulated using the historical operating results
of a single-asset regional shopping center and a portfolio of
regional shopping centers, to determine if one structure or
another provided better returns with less volatility.
The results of this simulation suggested that hybrid
securities provide the investor with higher returns and less
volatility than leveraged or unleveraged equity securities.
This result held true even when different interest rates, equity
participation and loan-to-value levels were simulated.
Although the sensitivity analysis changed the returns and
standard deviations of each structure, it did not change the
ranking of the structures; convertible debt performed the best
and leveraged equity performed the worst. In all cases, the
single-asset security had slightly higher returns with more
volatility than the pooled-asset security.
These findings have several implications for underwriters
attempting to structure a privately placed security to be
marketed to Japanese investors. While every potential
transaction will have its own particular legal, tax, and other
constraints, which may make it necessary for underwriters to
choose one structure over another, from a purely financial
perspective, these findings suggest that hybrid securities, and
convertible debt in particular, provide higher returns with less
risk to the investor. With the hybrid structures, the investor
has the security of a first lien on the asset at the same time
that he participates in the equity or "upside" of the asset.
Due to the subordinated nature of a leveraged equity position,
its return, while comparable to the hybrid returns, has
substantially higher volatility.
In today's market, where Japanese investors want higher
yields and greater levels of collateral than they did even a
year ago, a hybrid structure may be a good alternative to an
equity structure. In addition to offering potentially greater
total yields, these hybrid structures have the added tax
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advantage for Japanese investors that contingent interest earned
from a bond is considered ordinary income and is not, therefore,
taxed as a capital gain. Note, however, that in the case of
convertible debt, once the option to convert from debt to equity
is exercised, the investor would become liable for capital gains
tax if a sale of the asset were to occur.
Although the research conducted for this study revealed no
evidence of an active secondary market for real estate
securities in Japan, it is likely that, if that market evolves,
a rated debt instrument would be more easily valued and
understood by investors than a private equity interest where no
convenient market place exists to price such an investment.
Since the hybrid structure can be rated and valued more easily
by investors than an unrated, equity interest in a property, it
should be preferable to investors.
From a legal and tax perspective, participating mortgages
should give underwriters more flexibility in structuring a
security than do equity investments. As mentioned in Chapter 3,
the Foreign Investment Real Property Tax Act of 1980 imposed
taxes on investment by foreigners, and some states in the U.S.
severely restrict or prohibit such investment. Since
participating mortgages are considered debt instruments -- at
least presently -- they should be exempt from these
restrictions.
With any real estate security offering, the underwriter must
match the vehicle to the needs of both the issuer and the
investor. Based on the results of this study, a hypothetical
security structure can be proposed.
As discussed in Chapter 2, the two-tier lease structure of
most retail operations allows for a convenient partitioning of
the debt into senior and subordinated classes. The senior note
holders would have a claim on mortgage cash flows, which, in
the case of a regional center, could match the minimum base
rents of the tenants. The sale of the subordinated notes could
be structured to match the percentage rents as well as the
appreciated value of the asset, which, in effect, would be like
an equity option since they represent a bet on the residual
value of the asset. Pricing may explicitly acknowledge this
relationship by providing participation in the residual on a
percentage basis rather than on a fixed basis.
Although this structure has been used for other commercial
assets, it may be more efficient for retail because of the
special retail lease structure. With a retail-based security,
risk and return could be better matched with separate classes of
debt than with other commercial assets which do not have base
and percentage rent structures.
Although this study has addressed many issues pertaining to
the structuring of regional-shopping-center-backed real estate
securities for Japanese investors, there are many areas that
require further study. More research needs to be done on the
performance of private real estate securities so that the
simulations can be made more realistic. Furthermore, this
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research focused only on the time period 1986-1990, and more
research over broader time horizons (more business cycles) would
help test some of the findings. In addition, it would be
worthwhile to separate regional centers and super regional
centers and evaluate their performance separately. Because
the real estate securities market continues to evolve and will
become an even more important source of capital for the U.S.
real estate industry, this study should be helpful in guiding
issuers, underwriters, and investors toward real estate security
structures that are both profitable and efficient as well as in
pointing out other areas of research that would be valuable to
explore.
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APPENDIX 1
Formula for Calculating the Market Value of a Bond: [53]
t
B = E C + M
j=1 (1+ kb) J (1+kb)
Where:
Bt= Market value of a bond at time t,
C = Dollars of interest paid each year,
j = Time subscript from 1 to t,
kb = Market rate of interest on equivalent risk, non
convertible debt issues,
M = Maturity value,
t = Number of years remaining until maturity.
Formula for Calculating the Market Value of an Option: [53]
t
C E C,
j=1 (1+kb)
Where:
Ct = Market value of option at time t,
Cd = Value of option at conversion date,
j = Time subscript from 1 to t,
kb = Market rate of interest on equivalent risk, non
convertible debt issues,
t = Number of years remaining until maturity.
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